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40EDUCATIONAL FINANCE: AN EXAMINATION OF POLICY
by
Harry M. Kaiser and Glenn L. Nelson *
Introduction
The responsibility of selecting and implementing educational finance
policy in the United States is left primarily to the states. Consequent-
ly, prevailing educational policies are a function of the values and atti-
tudes of the people in each state. No state shares the exact school finance
program with another. However, there exist several general types of
finance policies that are being employed throughout this nation.
This paper describes selected educational finance policies and ex-
amines their consequences. The first section contains an overview of the
types of taxation principles used in evaluating the “goodness” of a tax
and also discusses the various measures of well-being. This information
is a prerequisite for making an informed judgment on what constitutes a
good taxation system. The second section is devoted to the various kinds
of state aid provided in a state-local revenue sharing program. More
specifically, the uniform funding formula and the cost-based funding for-
mula will be examined. The third section analyzes selected equalization
policies and their consequences. The three policies reviewed in this
section are the minimum foundation aid program, district power equalizing,
and family power equalizing. Family power equalizing is interesting, not
only because it is an equalization policy, but, because the funding re-
cipient is the family rather than the district. The fourth and final
section is intended to integrate the policies so that the reader may make
a more informed decision as to selecting which policy, or mix of policies,
to support.
An Overview of Taxation Principles and Measures of Well-Being
The purpose of this section is to briefly discuss the various prin-
ciples of taxation and to examine the measures of well–being with respect
to taxpayers. The reader should then be in a better position to select
which principle(s) of taxation, and which measure(s) of well-being to use
when selecting the tax or mix of taxes that he or she feels is best for
financing education. It must be realized that a “good” principle for eval-
uating a tax, and a “good” measure of well-being is in large part a value
judgment and must be determined by each individual - hopefully after care-
ful consideration of the ultimate consequences associated with their posi-
tion. What is good for one person may be bad for another. Consequently,
this section is designed to aid the reader in making an informed judgment;
it is not an advocacy argument for any one tax program.
* Graduate Research Assistant and Associate Professor, respectively, in
the Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, University of
Minnesota, St. Paul.2
The two most common methods of evaluating a tax are the benefit and
ability-to-pay principles. According to the benefit principle, a good tax
is one in which the taxpayer receives benefits comparable to what he or she
contributes. For example, if an individual is receiving a marginal benefit
of $100 from a publicly provided good or service, he or she should be pay-
ing a marginal tax of $100 for the good or service. Evaluating a tax by
the benefit principle is not merely an examination of tax policy, but rather
an examination of tax and expenditure policy. According to this principle,
an equitable tax is one in which the taxpayer contributes according to
ability, The term ability is quite ambiguous and it may be difficult to
arrive at a uniform definition. To some, ability should be measured with
respect to wealth; others feel income is the best measure of ability; still
others feel the volume of spending provides the best measure. Consequently,
a concrete definition of ability will vary according to what one feels is
the best measure of it.
Important tradeoffs exist between the two approaches. Each
principle holds a different view of what a good tax system should be.
Consider a tax levied for the purpose of financing education. Using the
benefit principle of evaluation, the quality (or “goodness”) of the tax
would depend upon whether or not the marginal benefits from education
are equal to the marginal tax paid by an individual. Think of a
case where one family has an income of $10,000, pays $500 on taxes for edu-
cation, and has two children attending school; and another family has an
income of $25,000, pays $1,200 on taxes for education, and has two children
attending school. If the two families receive the same benefits from edu-
cation, the tax would be considered faulty under the benefit principle
because the first family is receiving the same benefits as the second but
is paying less for them. On the other hand, the tax may be considered
appropriate under the ability-to-pay principle if one assumes that the
best measure of ability is income. The reason why the tax would be ade-
quate from an ability-to-pay point of view is because the second family
possesses the ability to pay more than the first family in terms of annual
income. Therefore, each of us must judge which of these two principles
best reflects the appropriate goals of taxation.
There are some other principles on taxation that warrant brief men-
tion. According to the undeserved income principle, “a tax difference
should be made not only in relation to the quantity of income received or
of wealth accumulated but also in relation to how it was acquired” (Johns
et al., p. 158). This type of wealth would include excessive profits, ex- ——
cessive inheritances, excessive capital gains, and similar items. The
neutrality principle states that a tax should leave a person, a firm, or a
corporation in the same relative economic position after the tax is levied
as before it was levied (Johns et al., p. 160). This view holds that the ——
taxation system should not be a mechanism for redistributing income. Three
other principles are based on the yield of the tax. The adequacy of yield
principle evaluates a tax on how adequate it is with respect to financing
the essential governmental services. This principle allows for deficit
financing in the short run, however, in the long run, taxes must equal
spending. Consequently, taxes for all levels of government must be adequate
to provide for the essential public goods and services. The stability of
yield principle holds that in addition to financing these services, the tax
should yield enough revenue to prevent the government from deficit financing3
even in the short run. In other words, the revenue derived from the tax
must be stable regardless of fluctuations in the economy. Finally, the
flexibility of yield principle states that a tax should be sufficiently
flexible to raise different yields in times of prosperity and recession
because governmental services fluctuate with the business cycle. Thus,
the flexibility of yield principle is in direct conflict with the stabil-
ity of yield principle (Johns et al., pp. 161-162). There are numerous .—
other principles that have not been discussed; however, it is not the pur-
pose of this section to examine all the principles of evaluating taxation.
Tradeoffs exist among all the taxation theories. Economic theory does not
dictate which principles are the “best”. Taxation analysis is instead
designed to provide decision makers with the economic characteristics and
consequences of the various taxes, using different criteria as the basis
for their review. The “best” type of tax is decided through the political
arena leaving the decision to the voters.
Each tax will affect certain classes of people differently according
to their type of wealth, or measure of well-being. Some common measures
of well-being are: property wealth, total income, wage income, and con-
sumption. The corresponding taxes associated with these measures of well-
being are: the property tax, the income tax, the social security tax, and
the sales tax. These measures are interrelated to some degree. For ex-
ample, income and property wealth, or income and consumption may be highly
correlated. If SO, then a tax on property or a tax on consumption may
closely reflect an individual’s income.
However, the tax burden may be drastically altered by using different
measures. Suppose that a ranking system was created which ranked well-
being on a scale of 1 -5 (1 being most well-off and 5 being least well-off).
A specific individual may vary from one to five in this ranking scheme
when different measures of well-being are used as the basis for the ranking.
To illustrate this phenomenon consider the following two examples.
Assume individual B is a doctor that has just graduated from medical
school . B has also started work and has an annual income of $60,000.
Medical school was expensive, and B has $40,000 of loans that must be re-
payed. B also wishes to alleviate his or her debt as soon as possible.
How well off is B? This question may be answered differently by each
measure of well-being. BecauseB has just started working his or her ac-
cumulation of property wealth is assumed to be quite low. Hence, in terms
of property wealth B is quite poor. With an annual salary of $60,000, the
individual’s wage income is quite ‘high. Consequently, in terms of wage in-
come B should be considered well-off (close to the 1 rank). Since B is
concerned about repaying the loan as soon as possible, B’s consumption may
be small relative to his or her income. Therefore, in terms of consumption
B may be classified as being moderately well-off. B has fluctuated from
one extreme (5) to the other (1) and this presents a situation where only
one measure of well-being may not reflect B’s true wealth. When all of the
measures are applied to B, the resulting average measure of well-being may
be more adequate than any one measure.
In contrast to the first example consider the following case. Indi-
vidual Q is a retired construction worker. Q’s annual income of $11,000
is derived primarily from social secutiry, but the individual owns a house4
that has a market value of $70,000. The house, which is free of debt, is
Q’s only major investment. How well-off is Q? Again this question may
be answered differently with respect to each measure of well-being. Be-
cause of owning a $70,000 house Q’s property wealth is high relative to
the other measures. Accordingly, in terms of property wealth Q may be
close to the 2 rating. Since Q is retired, he or she has no wage income
and therefore would rank low on the income measure. ThuS , consumption may
be lower than when Q was working, but is probably moderate, say (3). As
one may see, Q’s well-being has also fluctuated with every measure. As
in the first example, a mix of these measures may provide a more adequate
explanation of true well-being than any single measure.
The four measures do have some degree of correlation among them. If
a person expects that his or her wage income will increase, then the person’s
consumption and property wealth may also increase. Increasing property
wealth is often associated with increasing income and consumption. Ex-
amining the degree of correlation among these measures is beyond the scope
of this paper. The important point in this context is that the measures
are different but not completely independent.
The reader must determine which measure(s) is the most appealing. If
one feels that income is the best measure of well-being then the income tax
will probably be the most appealing tax. If one feels that property is the
best measure of well-being then the property tax will probably be the most
appealing. If one feels that wage income is the best measure of well-
being than a tax similar to the social security tax will probably be the
most appealing. If one feels that consumption is the best measure of
well-being then the sales tax will probably be the most appealing. Finally,
if one feels that a blend of the measures is most appropriate then the
corresponding mix of taxes would be viewed as best. However, the selected
tax(es) will also depend upon what principle of taxation is selected.
In summary, there is no taxation principle or measure of well-being
which receives consensus support. There is a degree of correlation among
the principles as well as the measures of well-being. Each of us, as
voting citizens, must make a decision as to what constitutes a good prin-
ciple of taxation and what constitutes an appropriate measure of well-
being. This section has, of course, merely scratched the surface of a
complicated and controversial subject. However, a brief review serves as
a useful reminder that there are various principles and measures, reflect-
ing different values or opinions, that give a broad choice as to what a
good taxation system is.
Uniform Funding Formula —
The uniform funding formula is a flat grant allotted to each school
district in the state based solely on the average daily attendance (ADA)
11 The grant is neither or another comparable pupil measure in each district.—
~/ The term “district” may be replaced by the term “family” in the dis–
cussion of the uniform funding formula and the cost-based funding
formula to incorporate the concept of the voucher system.5
a function of the district’s tax paying ability, nor a function of the
difference in pupil costs within each grade level. The grant may, and
typically does, consider the differences in costs for pupils at different
grade levels, It is important to keep in mind that there are many ver-
sions of the uniform funding formula, and they vary considerably in the
degree of restrictions placed on the funding recipient. A model that
places a high degree of restrictions on the funding unit may stipulate a
minimum and a maximum amount on funds to be raised by local districts for
education. Together with this requirement, perhaps a type of equalizing
policy would be added in which wealthy districts raising funds over the
maximum would be required to pay the excess to the state. In contrast,
a model that places a low degree of restrictions on the funding recipient
may only require that a minimum amount be raised locally for education,
and the district would be free to raise anything above that for education.
To illustrate the consequences of the uniform funding formula the follow-
ing assumptions will be made with respect to the model:
1. The model will have a low degree of restrictions on the funding
unit .
2. The state places a minimum millage rate on what the dis-
tricts may raise locally and the districts are free to
tax at or above that level.
3. The state does not compensate for variations in pupil costs
(with the exception of different costs related to different
grade levels).
One group that is adversely affected by the uniform funding formula
is composed of the poor school districts within the state. These school
districts cannot generate revenue for education as easily as the average
school districts in the state. For example, the amount a wealthy district
is able to raise by taxing at 0.5% of their wealth may take a poor dis-
trict a tax rate of 10.0% to raise. Consequently, the degree of inequality
between relatively poor and wealthy districts depends upon two factors:
1) the percent of state aid allocated per ADA pupil unit for education;
and 2) the actual difference in wealth among districts, assuming there are
no restrictions on local effort in the model.
Generally, the greater the percentage that the state allocates for
public education relative to locally raised funds, the smaller the inequal-
ity will be among wealthy and poor districts. One qualification must be
made with regard to this statement. The reduction of the revenue disparity
is also a function of the type of tax structure utilized by the state. If
the tax structure for educational revenue is primarily progressive (a pro-
gressive income tax, for example), the state allocation of educational
funds will have an equalizing effect on education since the more affluent
districts will have a higher tax rate and tax base than poorer districts.
The result will be a net flow of funds from the wealthy to the poor dis–
tricts. Consider the following example, summarized in Table 1. Assume
that there are two districts in a state, one is wealthy with an average in-
come of $25,000 per person and the other is less affluent with an income
of $8,000 per person. Both districts have 50 pupil units and, for simplicity,6
Table 1
Net flows of educational revenues under a progressive
versus a regressive tEiiC.
District 1






progressive tax equal to Net flow
5% J30,000 .—










progressive tax equal to
6.5%
regressive tax equal to
4.8%
*Assumes, full state financing in order to illustrate the degree of equalization
from both types of taxes.
assume that the state supplies all the revenue for education to the dis-
tricts by means of a uniform grant. It costs $100,000 to finance these
two districts, and the wealthy district has a tax rate of 6.5 percent
while the poor district has a tax rate of 5 percent. Total income in the
wealthy district is $1,250,000 (50 x $25,000 assuming 50 incomes in each
district) and total income in the poor district is $400,000 (50 x $8,000).
In order to raise the $100,000 needed to finance these two districts the
state collects approximately $80,000 from the wealthy district and ap-
proximately $20,000 from the poor district. The net flow to the poor dis-
trict from the wealthy district is $30,000.
However, if the taxes for educational revenue by the state are predom-
inantly regressive (e.g., sales tax) then the state allocation will have
less of an equalizing effect. In the same hypothetical case, assuming that
the tax rate in the poor district is 10% and the tax rate in the wealthy
district is 4.8%, then the poor district will generate $40,OOO(1O%X4OO,OOO)
and the rich district will generate $60,000 (4.8% x $1,250,000) for the
$100,000 needed to finance the two districts. In this instance, there still
is a net flow of funds to the poor district from the wealthy district, how-
ever, it is only $10,000 rather than $30,000 in the case of the progres-
sive income tax.
If there is a large variation in wealth among the districts, the uni-
form funding formula will be ineffective in reducing the gap among poor and
wea%thy districts, given that the state contributes a low percentage of the
educational funds. The gap will be larger if state revenues are raised by
a regressive tax instead of a progressive tax. Consequently, if the uniform
funding formula does not consider variations in tax paying ability, there
is no corrective remedy for relieving the disparities in wealth among the
districts.7
Another group that is adversely affected by the uniform funding
formula is composed of those districts that have a large number of high
cost pupils. There are many types of high cost pupils that range from cul–
turally disadvantaged pupils to the severely handicapped. There are also
variations in the costs of each high cost pupil. For example, a student
that is transported over five miles to school may cost the district 1.1
times as much as a “typical” student costs to educate, whereas, a handicap-
ped student may cost the district 3.7 times as much.~/ Under the uniform
grant model used in this analysis, these cost differentials are ignored
in the formula for state aid. The effects of the uniform grant model on
high cost districts may best be shown by the following example.
Consider a rural school district in a state operating under the uni-
form funding formula. Assume this district is composed of small schools in
which the majority of pupils must be transported a distance of at least five
miles. The salaries of the teachers in this district are the same as the
state average, however, there are fewer pupils per teacher than the state
average. Hence, this district has relatively higher costs than the aver-
age district. In order to provide an equivalent quality of education (i.e.,
provide equivalent resources) this district will have to levy a higher tax rate
to compensate for the higher costs. However, the costs may be so high that
the taxpayers could not afford to pay for the entire compensation. This
district may have to settle for an inferior standard of education relative
to the state average. If one values equal opportunity of education among
districts as the most important element in educational finance, then one
may choose to reject the uniform funding formula as a means to achieve it.
In fact the constitutional validity of educational finance policies that
cause disparities among districts has become legally questionable in the
last several years. More precisely, we must ask, does a policy that allows
for differentials in educational resources among districts violate the
Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
The responsibility of selecting and implementing educational finance
policy in the United States is left primarily to the states. This right
was given to the states by the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
which states: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Con-
stitution, nor porhibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States,
respectively, or the people.” Since education is not explicitly contained
in the U.S. Constitution, the states view their right as an inherent power
safeguarded by the Tenth Amendment. The majority of constitutional cases
reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court have affirmed this.
The issue of whether or not school finance programs may allow for
revenue disparities among school districts is unresolved. The critical
issue that remains unsettled is whether educational finance formulas that
product significant variations in revenue among districts deny some districts
equal protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. In Brown v.
Board of Education (1954) the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that revenue raised
by state finance scheme& “must be accorded to all on equal terms”. However,
~/ The term “typical” implies an associated weight equal to 1.8
little consensus exists to the literal interpretation of the judicial
“equal”.
In McInnis v. Ogilvie (1969), the U.S. Supreme Court held that finance
policies that allowed for revenue disparities are not in violation of the
~ourteenth Amendment. The Court reje~ted the plaintiff’s contention that
the method of financing education in Illinois failed to provide each child
equal opportunity for education. The Court presented two reasons for their
decision. First, the Fourteenth Amendment does not require the disperse-
ment of educational revenue solely on the grounds of the educational needs
of pupils. Second, there areno “discoverable and manageable standards”
that may be applied to this issue to form a criteria to test its consti-
tutional validity. The second point is extremely important to the entire
issue. The “needs” rationale offered by the plaintiff is what the Court
rejected. In fact, some argue that McInnis was not much of a setback for
supporters of the plaintiff’s position because “the reality of hope for
positive action from the Supreme Court remains largely a function of the
development of a satisfactory rationale” (Coon, et al., p. 315). ——
In 1970, the California Supreme Court rendered a decision in Serrano v.
Priest that was directly in conflict with McInnis. The issue set forth in
Serrano holds that the quality of public education may not be “a function
of the wealth of ... (a pupil’s parents and neighbors” (Garms, et al.,
p. 217). Finance programs that base educational revenue on the wealth of
——
districts violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
However, the Serrano doctrine applied only to California.
Soon after Serrano, many state courts invalidated their school finance
programs on similar grounds. Minnesota was one of these states. In Van
Dusartz v. Hatfield (1971) a U.S. District Court rules that Minnesota~
school finance program was in violation of the Equal Protection Cla’lseof
the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. District Judge Miles Lord clearly illus-
trated how revenue raised by the Minnesota program was a function of dis-
trict wealth. The funding formula attempted to aid all districts by
guaranteeing them $404 per pupil (formula allowance) if their tax rates
were at least 20 mills. If a district taxed at 20 mills and did not raise
the retire formula allowance, the state paid the difference. If a district
taxed at 20 mills and raised over the formula allowance, it was allowed to
use the excess for educational expenditures. In addition, the formula pro-
vided a uniform grant of $141 per pupil irregardless of district wealth.
This grant only aided those districts that raised over the formula allow-
ance because the $141 minimum pupil guarantee was included as part of the
equalizing aid given to districts raising less than the formula allowance.
Hence, if the grant was abolished it would only hurt the wealthy districts
raising funds in excess of the formula allowance. In Judge Miles Lord’s
words:
“To sum up the basic structure, the rich districts may and do
enjoy both lower tax rates and higher spending. A district
with $20,000 assessed valuation per pupil and a 40 mill tax
rate on local property would be able to spend $941 per pupil;
to match that level of spending the district with $5,000
taxable wealth per pupil would have to tax itself at more than
three times that rate, or 127.4 mills.” (Mazzoni, p. 49).9
The plaintiffs withdrew their suit because the legislature was in special
session drafting a new finance program (Collins and Johnson, p. 160) .
Since many state courts were challenging the McInnis decision, the
U.S. Supreme Court had to once again consider this issue. The U.S.
Supreme Court invalidated many of the state court decisions, including
Serrano, in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez (1973).
The Court rejected the Serrano doctrine as having any effect on federal
law, stating that the issue of equalization in school finance is a state
matter.
How does all of this relate to and affect the uniform funding formula?
First, if the formula allows for disparities among districts, it will have
to be remedied in the states where the courts have ruled on this issue.
Second, the uniform grant will most likely have to incorporate some type of
equalizing program (to be discussed in detail later in the paper) in order
to insure equal financial opportunity, although not necessarily equal
actual financial allocations. Finally, the uniform grant may endure (in
its present form) in some states if the United States Supreme Court does
not reverse its previous stand on the issue. Despite the shortcomings
(legal and equity) of the uniform funding formula, there are some basic
advantages of its implementation.
One advantage of the uniform funding formula is that it is easily
administered and easily understood. In fact, some argue that “the greatest
virtue of the uniform grant model is its simplicity” (Coons et al., 1978,
p. 194). The state allots
.—
the uniform grant to each district based on
the number of ADA pupils in each grade level. The calculation of various
weights per pupil only needs to be done for different grade levels. For
example, pupils in kindergarten may have a weighted value of 0.75; pupils
in grades 1 through 8 may have a weighted value of 1.0; and pupils in
high school may have a weighted value of 1.25. The absence of complicated
weight formulas for each category of high cost pupil makes this policy ap-
pealing for some. Thus, one may argue that the uniform funding formula is
less costly to administer and tends to reduce the bureaucracy at the state
level fox education. In addition, the simplicity of the uniform funding for-
mula facilitates understanding on the part of citizens, who are thereby in
a better position to debate and vote on matters of educational policy.
The unfiorm funding formula also creates incentives for each district
to cut costs within its curriculum. To illustrate, consider a school dis-
trict with extremely high transportation costs per pupil. These costs arise
because a majority of pupils live a far distance from the schools. Under
certain finance schemes the state differentiates between high and low cost
districts when dispensing the grants, and allocates the grants in a direct
relationship with respect to costs. If the state employs a system of school
finance similar to this, a district with high transportation costs will re-
ceive a larger grant than lower cost districts. If one also assumes that
the transportation costs are paid entirely by the state, then the result of
such a policy is clear. There is no incentive for this district to at-
tempt to reduce 5ts transportation costs. If some of the costs could be
reduced by more effective planning or other factors, they may not be re-
duced for lack of incentive. However, if the state is operating under a
uniform grant program, the district will not receive more aid for its high10
transportation costs. Consequently, an incentive exists for the district
to lower its costs. This concept may be further developed by examining
a hypothetical school district and its related cost curves (Figure 1).
Figure 1




X1* X* x;* IIof pupils
In this example the school district (District A) has X. students
measured in terms of average daily attendance (ADA). At X. the district
may not be operating on t+e optimal short run average cost curve, labeled
SRAC*, but rather could be operating on another SWC such as SRAC~ or SRAC2.
in which case the plant size is either too small or too large, respectively.
The optimal plant sizes associated with SRACl and SRAC2 are XT and XT,
where the short run marginal cost (SRMC) intersects the short run average
cost (SRAC) at its minimum and the SRAC is tangent to the long run average
cost (LRAC). EiGher of these two optimal output levels could be obtained
by either two approaches. The first approach would entail altering the
f
plant size so that X or X; is the output. This might be done by consoli-
dation with another district so that either more pupils are added to Dis-
trict A (to reach Xl), or some pupils are taken from A (to reach X~) and
enrolled in another district. However, there are several serious problems
that may result frc)mthe first approach. The first problem, which is pol~-
tical, is that the parents of the children involved may object to having
their children moved to another school. Since the parents have voting power,
such a measure would probably meet political defeat. The second pr~blem,
which is economic, is that bringing District A into equilibrium may cause
another district to be forced out of equilibrium. Thus, the first approach
may be impractical if not impossible to obtain.
The second approach would entail altering the short run average cost
(SRAC) of District A. If District A is operating on SRACl or SRAC2, the
objective would be to adjust the SR,ACso that it would move towards SRAC*.
For example, if District A is operating at too large of a plant size (SRAC2)
then the mix of inputs should be changed, possibly by adding more capital
in place of labor. Perhaps installing computer terminals or other substi-
tutes for teacher-pupil instruction may be the approach to achieve this.Wilile the initial cost of doing this may be high, it may pay for itself in
the long run.
How does all of this relate to the uniform funding formula? The answer
is that the uniform funding formula may be the major incentive for District
A to attempt to achieve,a more optimal output. As was mentioned earlier,
other policies that compensate districts with high costs tend to reduce in-
centives for them to cut their costs. Therefore, the uniform funding for-
mula may be the major driving force behind such a switch in cost curves.
The uniform funding formula may place virtually no restrictions on
the funding recipients. Generally, the state establishes a minimum millage
rate and each district is free to tax at or above the legal limit. What -
ever is raised by the district may be applied together with the state
uniform grant towards education. Some would argue that education should
be decentralized and that local control is of vital importance for our
nation. The uniform funding formula would be placed in a category that
stresses this philosophy. Also , educational values vary between districts,
with some placing heavy emphasis on education, and some placing less em-
phasis on education. Under the uniform funding formula districts are
free, to a certain extent, to determine how much should be allocated to
educate their children. ThuS , if one values a system with a low degree
of state restrictions, the uniform funding formula should be considered.
Cost-Based Formula
The cost-based formula is an offspring of the uniform funding formu-
la. Under the cost-based formula, the state allots educational grants to
each district in the state. However, the grants are not uniform, but
rather proportionate to the level of costs associated with each district.
Districts that face higher costs receive more state aid relative to dis-
tricts with lower costs. Similar to the uniform grant, the cost-based
formula has many versions that vary with respect to restrictions placed on
the funding recipients. An example of a cost-based program that places a
low degree of restrictions on the district is where the state establishes
a minimum level that must be raised locally for education. Each district
would be free to raise as much revenue as it desired as long as the revenue
was greater than the established minimum. The locally raised revenue could
be applied with the state cost-based grant for education. An example of
a program with a high degree of restrictions is where the state establishes
a minimum and a maximum amount on what can be raised locally. In addition,
if the tax base of a wealthy district yields revenue above the legal limit,
the state would capture the excess funds from the district. To examine
the consequences of the cost-based formula the following assumptions will
be made with respect to the model:
1. The cost-based model will have a low degree of restrictions on
the funding recipient.
2. The state stipulates a minimum millage rate on local education
taxes, and each district is free to operate at or above the
legal minimum.12
The uniform grant model adversely affected the relatively poor dis-
tricts within the state. It is difficult to distinguish whether or not the
poor districts are better off under the cost-based formula, since this model
is a function of cost rather than well-being. Therefore, one should be cau-
tious about deriving any generalizations concerning improvements in education-
al opportunity for poor districts resulting by a switch in policy from a
uniform to cost-based grant. The poor districts will receive more state
aid if they incur higher educational costs relative to the average district
in the state. There may be some correlation between poor districts and high
costs. Higher costs could be associated with a number of factors, such as:
a larger number of pupils participating in a free hot lunch program, a
larger number of pupils receiving free bus fare; a higher cost of educating
children originating from below poverty level homes; and perhaps higher
teacher salaries to induce incentives for teachers to work in poor school
districts. If there are high costs in a poor school district, the cost-
based model will tend to have an equalizing effect in the state by lowering
the differential of costs among districts.
The degree of equalization in the cost-based model depends upon three
factors: 1) the percent of state aid allotted per ADA pupil; 2) the actual
difference in income among districts; and 3) the level of costs associated
with the poor districts. Since the first two factors were discussed in
the previous section they need not be re-examined. Instead the attention
will focus on the third factor. Poor districts may often have higher
costs compared to more affluent districts, but it need not be the rule. If
one assumes that poor districts do have higher costs, then the equaliza-
tion of educational cost differentials will depend upon the actual difference
in cost and the percent of state revenue provided for education. The actual
cost differential and the amount of state revenue per district has a posi-
tive relationship, i.e., the higher the costs the more the district will
receive from the state. But what about the actual mechanism of how the
grant is determined? Before this is answered the term “output” must be
defined.
In the illustration that follows, X is defined as output. However,
output may mean different things in an educational context. One way to
define output is the difference between a student’s competency level before
and after the schooling experience. Output, when defined in this manner,
follows a “value added” rationale. How might competency be measured, em-
ployingthe value added approach? Standardized aptitude examinations would
be one measure. For example, upon entering and graduating from school,
every student would be required to take an examination. The difference in
the second and the first examinations would be the value added or output.
One problem inherent with this approach is the difficulty associated with
devising an examination that accurately measures competency. One need only
look at the current IQ and aptitude examinations to support this claim.
Another problem inherent in this approach is the lack of breadth of learning
covered by scholastic examinations. For example, most aptitude tests
generally include an English section, a mathematics section, a history sec-
tion and a science section. But these sections are not always written to
include much of the content discussed within them. Also , subjects such as
art, music, home economics, and vocational education are generally absent in
these tests. Therefore, a comprehensive measure of value added would be
difficult to obtain using the present aptitude examinations.13
Another method of measuring output is to require only one examination,
which would be taken by everv student upon graduation. The examination
could be based on a pre-determined standard of what an average high school
graduate (on a national or statewide basis) should have learned in twelve
years of education. The output of every school would be based on the ex-
amination scores of its pupils and could be compared to state and national
norms. This method has the accuracy problems that are present in the value
added approach. Another problem with this approach is that it does not
reflect the change in competency of each student from when he or she entered
school to graduation. ThuS , the examination is basically a device for com-
paring output among students from different schools rather than comparing the
changes in knowledge experienced by students, i.e., value added.
The final output measure to be discussed here is the number of pupils
in average daily attendance (ADA). This method defines output solely by
the number of pupils in each school district. This measure is commonly
used in funding formulas and is the easiest of the three approaches to im-
plement. One problem with this method is that it does not reflect the
quality of output. Consequently, comparisons regarding the quality of out-
put among districts become virtually impossible because one district may
require stringent standards of students while another district may have re-
laxed standards for students. Output may only be compared in terms of the
quantity of students.
All three approaches have advantages and disadvantages. The illus-
tration that follows will use the third approach. However, any of the
three approaches could be used for measuring output (X). The third approach
was chosen for purposes of simplicity and relevance to prevailing practice.
In order to exemplify the basic mechanics behind the cost-based for-
mula the following assumptions will be made. It is important to note that
this illustration is much simplier than those policies actually implemented.
Let X = La be the production function for two school districts, a district
that has costs equal to the state average (normal district) and a high
cost district relative to the state average, where
X = outout level (students)
L = labor input
The cost relations would be:
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average cost per student,
marginal cost per student, and
wage rate of labor.
two cases that will be presented to demonstrate the effects
of a cost-based grant on the two districts. The first case is based on
the production side (i.e., different u values). The second case deals with
input factor price differentials (i.e., different wage rates).
Case 1 (different a values)
In Case 1 there are two districts that are approximately equal in
size, wealth, and socioeconomic composition. District 1 has total costs
for education that are equal to the state average. District 2 has a
larger number of high-cost students relative to District 1 and therefore
has higher total costs. The breakdown of cost relationships between the
two districts is:

















In the absence of the cost-based grant, District
than District 1. The ratio of marginal costs between
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= 2WX
2 faces higher costs






+x’. This means that for each additional student District 2’s cost is ~ X3
times as much as District 1’s cost. The cost-based grant will equalize the
costs between both districts (assuming that the normal cost district has
costs equal to the state average). The grant is determined by the differ-
ence in average costs between the districts and the state average. Thu S ,
the cost-based grant is determined by the following method:District 1
Cost differentiall=AC1-ACstate
average















Thu S , the cost differential has been determined on the basis of average
costs. To compute the cost-based grant, one must provide this differential
to District 2 in addition to some fixed grant (FG) which both districts re-
ceive. 1
7
‘1 = FG ‘2
=FG+W(X-X)
where G = cost-based grant.











To obtain TC from AC one must multiply AC by X.
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ThuS , in this first case, all costs are equalized by the cost-based grant.
Next consider the second case where a wage rate differential is the source
of cost disparity.
Case 2 (different W values)
Case 2 assumes that both districts have identical production func-
tions (al = a2), but District 1 has a lower wage rate (W ) for its faculty
and administration than District 2 (W2).
Distrir.t 1 “(WI= 5) District 2 (W = 8)
2
1 1 — —







In the absence of the cost-based grant, District 2 faces higher costs than
(:- 1)
~ 8X




This means that for each additional student
times as much as District 1’s cost. The cost-based
cost between both districts (assuming that District
the state average). The grant is determined by the
costs between the districts and the state average.
grant is determined by the following method!
District 2’s cost is ~
grant will equalize the
1’s costs are equal to
difference in average
Thus, the cost-based
District 1 District 2
Cost differential = ACI - ACstate Cost differential_ = AC2 - ACstate
because it is
average average
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In order to compute the cost-based grant to the districts, the cost dif-
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- FG]X TC2 = 8X ~ -[FG+3x ]x
1 1 1 — — —
= 5XU + FC - FG(X) = 8Xa + FC - FG(X) - 3Xa
1 —
= 5Xa + FC - FG(X)
To obtain the MC take the first derivative of TC with respect to X.
Again, costs in both districts are equalized by the cost-based grant.
In comparison with the uniform funding formula, the cost-based for-
mula is more difficult to administer. Weights have to be assigned to every
pupil according to his or her respective cost category. The educational
bureaucracy would probably become larger in order to accommodate these ad-
justments. It is impossible to have complete accuracy with respect to the
weights. Therefore, the cost-based policy could cause more inequality in
the state than the uniform funding formula. A consequence such as this
might occur if the administration was incompetent or if the differentials
originally included for cost-based reasons became the product of political
rather than educational decisions.18
Some criticize the cost-based model for not providing incentives to
district educational leaders to plan a program in the least costly manner.
This argument was examined in the previous section. However, one may dis-
sent to this rationale by mentioning an example of a high-cost district
that has reduced expenditures as much as possible but still has high costs.
Should this district be penalized for its high costs? Many people say “no”,
because this district has organized its curriculum so as to minimize its
costs. Nevertheless, this controversial question may be left to the reader
to decide, because both points of view have valid arguments. The cost–
based formula does present a viable alternative to the uniform
formula. If one values a policy that offsets the differential




The purpose of a minimum foundation program is to establish a floor
under the amount of educational resources of each school district. The
minimum program level is decided by determining the amount of resources
that are necessary to enable a district of a given size to provide each
pupil with an adequate education. The term adequate is of course ambiguous
and controversial. Thu S , the minimum program usually varies with respect
to who the policy-makers are. There have been many definitions of what is
adequate and how it should be measured under a minimum foundation program.
It is not the intent of this section to define the term. Rather, three
examples of minimum foundation programs will be examined to provide the
reader with a basic understanding of how the programs work.
The first example of a minimum foundation program is where a minimum
level of resources is determined and every school, regardless of size, is
guaranteed that level. This level may include a specific number of math,
English, history, art, physical education, and social studies courses
that would be offered. The basic philosophy of such a policy could differ
in two ways: 1) the minimum program (e.g., in a very small district) would
ideally be the equal of a program administered in a larger district; or
2) the minimum program would be determined by the legal minimum amount of
resources decided by government and would not necessarily be equal among
districts. For our purposes, the second approach to the minimum foundation
program will be examined.
To illustrate one case of a minimum foundation program consider the
following example. A state provides a grant per pupil (could be uniform
or cost-based) to all or the school districts to ensure that a predetermined
program is funded. The grant (G) could take many forms, such as:
G = a K+ alE + aH
uniform grant o 2
a = weights associated with different grade levels
K = pupil units in kindergarten
E = pupil units in first through eighth grade
H = pupil units in high school19
or
a, 6 and ~ = the weights assigned to various costs
A = the number of AFDC recipients, with grade level indicated
by subscript
B = the number of students transported over five miles, with
grade level indicated by subscript
T = the number of special education students, with grade
level indicated by subscript
Q= total ADA- (A+B+T)2’
In the absence of a minimum program the grant to each district would
take on the graphical relationship as shown in Figure 2 (for illustrative
purposes assume that the state uses a uniform grant). Districts with small
enrollments may not be able to raise enough educational resources to pro-
vide pupils with an adequate education under this policy (e.g., District 1
with XO pupils). The greater the percent of educational funds that are
provided by the state, the more severe would be the problem. Therefore,
the absence of a minimum foundation program would cause problems for dis-
tricts with small enrollments, and especially severe in small districts
with declining enrollments.
Figure 2
State aid funding formula without a minimum program
$ per G=
dfstrict
aOK + alE + ~2H
o ‘o
‘——N (number of pupils)
The funding formula could be adjusted quite easily to provide for a
minimum foundation program. This may be done in numerous ways. One
~f This example is not as complex as an actual weighted formula. It is
simply for illustrative purposes.20
method would be for the state to define a package of resources (perhaps
the dollar value per pupil unit of the resources) that would meet the
requirement for an adequate education. This level (M) would be guaranteed
to all districts below a certain number of pupils (N*). The adjustment to the
funding formula under this method is illustrated in Figure 3.
Figure 3
State aid funding formula with a minimum program that does not
distinguish variation in size among districts below
t







N* N (number of pupils)
By adjusting the funding formula in this manner small districts that
face declining enrollments are protected from losing state aid. This is
even more relevant when the financial structure of state education is de-
signed so that the state provides the bulk of the funds for education.
One problem with this structure of a minimum foundation program is that
there is no distinction made among districts of varying size below N*.
Consequently, a district that has N* pupils and a district that has close
to zero students receive the same amount of state aid.
The funding formula may be modified to alleviate this problem. The
modified formula is similar to the first in that it guarantees districts
with less than N~~pupils a minimum amount of resources of at least M dol-
lars per district .However, this formula also distinguishes between the
number of pupils in the range zero to N~~. Therefore, a district with N*
pupils will receive more state aid than a district with less pupils. The
minimum foundation program under this program is shown in Figure 4.
There are numerous other methods of tunding minimum foundation programs.
These two examples are adequate for demonstrating how a state may struc-
ture such a program.
The second type of a minimum foundation program is the policy developed
by George Strayer and Robert Haig during the 1920’s for the purpose bf re-
ducing disparities in educational revenue among school districts. This
type of minimum foundation program is the most widely used educational fund-
ing formula in the United States (Boroson, et al. , p. IV-2) . The objectives
of this program are two-fold: (1) to provi~ equal educational opportunity
for all pupils in the state through “equalized” revenue raised by the program;
and (2) fiscal neutrality in school finance by multiplying the uniform tax
rate to assessed local wealth per pupil and by allocating state aid in-
versely with respect to district wealth.21
Figure 4
State aid funding formula with a minimum program that does distinguish








N* N (number of pupils)
Under this program, each participating district is guaranteed a mini-
mum level (formula allowance) of revenue per pupil for its educational cur-
riculum. Each district must levy the mandated tax rate, and the state SUp-
plies the differential between the amount that the district raises and the
formula allowance. The formula for determining state aid is:
District Number of Mandated
‘A~~a~e x Pupils ) - ‘Tax Rate x
Local Property
State Aid = Wealth )
The Strayer-Haig formula in its pure form adheres to the principle that
equal effort deserves equal reward. Thus, regardless of a district’s wealth,
it is guaranteed the same amount of revenue per pupil, given that it levies
the foundation tax rate. This implies that districts with unequal wealth
will receive different percentages of state aid. The funding recipient will
be granted more state aid the lower its tax base and less state aid the higher
its tax base. It is generally true that states employing the Strayer-Haig
formula have some districts that do not participate in the program because
their tax base is too high for them to qualify for any state aid. To ex-
emplify the equalizing affects of this policy consider the following hypo-
thetical state.
Assume that a state sets the minimum foundation level (formula allowance)
at $1,000 per pupil, and the required tax effort at 15 mills. District A
has property value equal to $35,000 per pupil and District B has property
value equal to $65,000 per pupil. State aid for these two districts is
calculated in the following manner:
District A District B
State aid = $1,000 - (* x 35,000) State aid
= $1,000 - (~x 65,000) per pupil $ per pupil >
= $1,000 - 525 = $1,000 - 975
= $475 = $2522
District A raises $450 less from the local property tax than does District B,
but A receives $450 more state aid than does B. Both districts realize
$1,000 per pupil unit at a tax effort of 15 mills, despite their difference
in wealth per student; thus, the state aid system is “fiscally neutral”.
If districts were only allowed to levy the mandated tax rate, then all
districts would receive the same amount of revenue per pupil. This would
be highly restrictive and perhaps politically infeasible. The Strayer-Haig
formula allows participating districts to tax above the required tax rate.
This add-on, which is known as “local leeway”, is a vital part of the pro-
gram. Proponents of the program emphasize that local option encourages
innovation and change within the educational system (Boroson, et al. ,
p. IV-3). The additional levies by a district are not calculated in the
.—
state aid formula. AS a result, districts with greater wealth are able to
raise more revenue per pupil than districts with less wealth for a given
effort level. The add on provision must be selected so that districts are
provided with some local leeway, but not to a degree where substantial dis-
parities are caused among district educational revenues. This is a compli-
cated task and the “correct” balance of equity and local leeway should be
determined by the people of each state.
Both types of minimum foundation programs discussed so far define the
package of resources in terms of dollars per district. Another method of
defining resources for a minimum foundation program is in terms of a
minimum size of staff needed for an adequate education. A recent study con-
ducted by the Center for Educational Policy Studies (CEPS) at the Univer-
sity of Minnesota is a good, relevant example of this approach (Sederberg,
et al.). This study sought an answer to defining needed educational re- ——
sources by examining actual practice in Minnesota, rather than by deriving
theoretical minimums as some other studies have done. The basic procedure
consisted of examination in each program area of how the ratio of full-time
equivalent (FTE) staff to 1,000 pupils differed in school districts of dif-
ferent size. By assuming that large districts are in a position to offer
a full educational program with efficient utilization of all staff, the
staff to pupil ratio in large districts becomes the norm to which other
districts can be compared. The actual ratio of FTE staff per 1,000 pupils
in a program area is called “service capability” in that area. In other
words, the capability of the school district to deliver educational services
in a program area is measured by the ratio of professional staff to students-
more staff time per student leading to greater capability. The authors con-
cluded that the current foundation program (in Minnesota), which is based
on dollars per pupils, will hurt districts that face declining enrollments
since state aid will be cut and these districts will be forced to make
drastic reductions in their programs. Consequently, they offer the alter-
native of service capabilities to solve this problem.
The service capability for each area was determined in the following
manner. Sederberg, et al. selected 345 Minnesota school districts (K-12 ——
enrollment) that had enrollments under 2,000 pupils for their study.
Service capability data were plotted against total enrollment. To fit the
curves to the plots, three types of curves were used: Polynomial, logarith-
mic, and square root. According to the authors, the polynomial curve pro-
vided the best fit for the data. The point at which the slope of the curve
was equal to zero (no change in service capability associated with a change
in enrollment) was determined. In other words, at this pdint, as enrollment
increases there is not a significant increase in service capability. These23
steps were carried out for all the program areas. The study produced the
following formula recommended for use in Minnesota:
FTE staff = 0.03534K+ 0.05765E+ 0.03012S + 0.00889T
where K = number of pupil units enrolled in kindergarten
E = number of pupil units enrolled in grades 1-6
S = number of pupil units enrolled in secondary grades
T=K+E+S
The coefficients were obtained by taking the service capability score that
was determined and dividing it by 1,000.~1 Hence, when this is multiplied
by the local enrollment in each category (K,E,S, and ‘E)the number of FTE
staff is obtained. If the average teacher salary is known one must simply
multiply it by the FTE staff to obtain the amount of revenue needed for
educational finance.
This scheme may work fine for average size school districts but what
about districts that are small? The same problem arises that was present




illustrated graphically in Figure 5.
Figure 5
State aid funding formula employing service capability as
a method of defining educational resources
/’
G=(.02524K+. 05765E+.0501S+. 0089T) (teacher salary)
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One possible solution to this problem is that the state could select
a minimum level of students (N*) that corresponded to what the state deemed
to be a minimum FTE staff that every school must have. Any district with
enrollments less than N~fwould receive the amount of funds that is necessary
for funding the minimum FTE staff. To demonstrate consider the following
example.
Assume that the average teacher salary per FTE staff is $15,000.
Further assume that N* is equal to 500 pupils. District A has an enroll-
ment of 400 pupils; 100 in kindergarten, 100 in grades 1 through 6, and
200 in secondary school (grades 7-12). What does District A receive in
&/ The coefficients in this eXaLllple were taken from the results of Sederberg,





The formula will be based on an enrollment size of 500 rather than
One simple way of





adding the additional 100 pupil units to District A
equally among each grade level. ThuS, the grant
~)+(.05765) (100+ ~)+(.05012) (200+ ‘:)
100 100
1
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In this case, District A would be guaranteed a minimum of $407,805 for
education. It is important to note that the enrollment and the teacher
salary figures are purely illustrative and were chosen arbitrarily. Where-
as, the formula was derived by Sederberg, et al. in their study. ——
However, this type of aid formula does not distinguish among districts
with varying enrollments below N*, i.e., 500 pupils in the above example.
As a result, a district with 500 pupils and a district with 200 pupils may
receive the same amount of aid. This problem was present in the first
minimum foundation program discussed and one should look back at Figure 3
to see the graphical presentation of the problem. The funding formula
based on staff requirements may be modified to alleviate this problem in
the same fashion that the first example was. Therefore, one need only to
examine the first example to see how this problem could be eliminated.
The three examples discussed above illustrate how minimum founda-
tion programs may differ. The first example demonstrated how the program
may be established to guarantee an absolute minimum amount of revenue that a
district must have in order to provide an “adequate” education. This type
of program does not contain a mechanism to equalize educational revenue
above the minimum, but rather places primary emphasis on guaranteeing an
“adequate” education to all. The second type of program equalizes educa-
tional revenue by guaranteeing equal funds for equal tax effort. This pro-
gram adheres to the principle that a district’s educational revenue should
not be determined by its wealth, but rather by its tax effort. The third
program offers an alternative to basing educational aid on dollars per
pupil. This program defines resources in terms of the staff required to
provide an adequate education. This concept, which is termed “service
capability”, may be applied to either of the two preceding minimum founda-
tion programs in place of the conventional dollars per pupil method.25
District Power Equalizing
District Power Equalizing (DPE) was developed during the 1960’s and
1970’s by John E. Coons, William H. Clune III, and Stephen D. Sugarman.
DPE became a new policy alternative to the conventional equalization for-
mulas that were thought to be inadequate by some with respect to minimizing
revenue inequities among districts. In their book, Private Wealth and
Public Education, Coons, Clune and Sugarman drafted the theoretical frame-
work for this policy which was based on two contentions. First , all dis-
tricts should have equal ability to raise educational revenue. Second, all
districts should have the freedom to choose the effort level desired to
finance their educational system. The latter contention, which is known
as “subsidiarily”, emphasizes that decision making “should be left to the
lowest possible level of government.
DPE is similar to the Strayer-Haig Minimum Foundation Program in that
state aid to districts is, in part, distributed in inverse proportion to
each district’s tax base. Districts are guaranteed an equal expenditure
level, for a given level of effort, irregardless of their tax base. This
is achieved via a combination of state and local revenue. Presented in
the form of a table, the DPE schedule establishes different levels of tax
effort to corresponding levels of guaranteed expenditures. A general form
of such a table is illustrated by Table 2. Districts may select any level
Table 2
DPE schedule presented in a generalized form
I
GUARANTEED






of effort by the schedule. If the revenue derived from the tax on local
property falls short of the guaranteed spending level specified in the DPE
schedule, the differential is made up by state aid.
For example, using the DPE schedule in Table 3 consider two hypotheti-
cal districts: District A and District B. Assume that District A has a
tax base equal to $25,000 per pupil and District B has a tax base equal to
$55,000 per pupil. If both districts choose to levy a tax equal to 10 mills,
each will receive $900 per pupil. At this effort level, District A raises
$250 per pupil (~ x $25,000) and District B raises $550 per pupil
9
(* x $55,000). In order to fill the gap between the guaranteed spending
9
level and the amount raised locally, District A is granted $650 per pupil26
Table 3
Hypothetical DPE schedule where S=E x $90,000 (Mill rates are
established by dividing the dollar amount of taxes by the
taxable property and multiplying the quotient by 1,000)
GUARANTEED
EFFORT (E) SPENDING LEVEL (S)
10 mills $900 per pupil
15 mills $1,350 per pupil
20 mills $1,800 per pupil
25 mills $2,250 per pupil
($900 - $250) in state aid and District B is granted $350 per pupil
($900 - $550) in state aid. Combining state with local revenues, Dis-
tricts A and B have $900 per pupil for educational revenue when eac”h
levies 10 mills. The computation of this example along with other pos-
sible options for Districts A and B are provided in Exhibit 1.
In theory, DPE formulas include a “recapture” or “negative subsidy”
provision. This stipulation allows the state to acquire revenue from
districts that raise an amount that is greater than the guaranteed spending
level at a given level of effort. For example, if District C has a tax
base equal to $95,000 per pupil and levies 20 mills, it will raise $1,900
per pupil. However, since the guaranteed spending level is $1,800 per
pupil at 20 mills effort (assuming the DPE schedule in Table 3), the state
captures $100 of the $1,900 in order to lower District C’s spending level
to $1,800. The $100 accruing to the state may be redistributed to those
districts receiving state aid. It is important to note that the concept
of negative subsidy is not included in any DPE programs operating in the
United States (Johnson and Collins, p. 334).
A key issue in the implementation of DPE is the type of schedule that
is chosen. There are three general forms of DPE schedules. The first form
is a schedule in which the relationship between effort and the guaranteed
spending level is constant throughout the entire table. Since each addi-
tional level of effort yields the same increment in the spending level,
the schedule is a linear function. Table 3 is an example of a linear DPE
schedule. The second type, an increasing schedule, is designed to encourage
additional effort. The increasing schedule allots greater increments of
expenditures for each additional level of effort. Table 4 depicts a DPE
schedule that is increasing. According to this schedule, a district will
receive an additional $637 per pupil if it increases the tax rate from 10
to 15 mills. Districts will be guaranteed $659 for another 5 mills in-
crease and $675 for the next 5 mills increment. Districts have an incentive


















































$1S113 ___ $637 for 5 a&itional millS
$1~770~$659 for 5 additional mills
$2,4291.
-$675 for 5 additional mills
$3,104 --
1 As = +1 x $90,000
On the other hand, the third form of DPE schedule - the decreasing
DPE schedule - tends to discourage high levels of effort by allocating
smaller increments of expenditures for every additional increment of ef-
fort. Table 5 depicts a decreasing DPE schedule. According to this table,
a district will receive an additional $315 per pupil if it increases its
tax rate from 10 to 15 mills. Districts will be guaranteed $304 for another
5 mills increase and $297 for the next 5 mills increment. Therefore, the
declining nature of this schedule may discourage districts from increasing
their tax rate. This result is deemed desirable by those concerned with
lessening the burden on state revenues and on taxpayers, but the result is











- $315 for 5 additional mills
$1,334’-
$304 for 5 additional mills
$1,631—-”
-- $297 for 5 additional mills
1
>’C s = E0”9 x $90,000
In the examples of DPE schedules the spending level was determined by
the product of the effort level (E) (in several cases E was some power, e.g.,
E1.1) and $90,(3(30. The $90,000 amount, which is an arbitrary figure chosen
for illustration, is the wealth level that policy makers feel is representa-
tive of the affluence of a model or “key” district. The selection of this
figure is a prerequisite to an effective DPE program. Since district
revenue is derived from district effort times this figure, the key district29
must be determined in a manner that insures the desired level of spending
by the state. For example, if the plan allows for 20 mills to yield a
guaranteed spending level of $1,700 per pupil when a 20 mills tax rate
raises $1,700 per pupil in only the wealthiest districts, then DPE becomes
primarily a state aid program. This is true because the state must make
up the differential between the amount districts raise locally and the
$1,700 spending level at 20 mills. If the average district in the state
raises $1,700 per pupil from a 20 mills tax effort, the state role is pri–
marily one of redistribution with little or no net cost to the state
treasury, assuming the state employs the negative subsidy or recapture pro-
vision. The level of wealth used in the formula, i.e., the “key district”,
must be carefully determined by the state so it coincides with the type of
policy desired.
It was stated earlier that there are three general types of DPE sched-
ules: linear, increasing, and decreasing. However, there are infinite
possibilities for DPE schedules that fall into each category. Figure 6
depicts several types of DPE schedules. Figure 6(a) exemplifies a linear
schedule where every mill yields $80 per pupil. The graph is drawn so that
40 mills appears to be the highest level of effort. However, it is possible
for this schedule to have the mill rate be as large as the districts de-
sire. A schedule such as this is called an “open ended” schedule. Figure
6(b) represents an increasing schedule where the spending level is equal to
E2 times $10,000. This schedule differs from the first in two ways. First,
it is not a linear relation. Second, it is closed ended because districts
may only levy between 10 and 30 mills. Figure 6(c) portrays a decreasing
open ended DPE schedule. Finally, Figure 6(d) illustrates a “kinked”
linear schedule. Districts receive $100 for each mill levied up to 20
mills. After 20 mills, districts receive $75 for every additional mill
levied. These are only several examples of DPE schedules. However, they
are useful in illustrating how schedules may be designed.
Figure 6
Several examples of DPE schedules presented graphically
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Family Power Equalizing
Advocates of the voucher system argue that the current public educa-
tional system should be changed so that more competition is induced into
the system. This, in their opinion, would lead to a system that guarantees
the family more of a voice in education, more diversity of educational pro-
grams, less restrictions placed on the family, and most importantly, more
of a choice for the family. There have been numerous proposals of voucher
systems, ranging from a virtually .unregulated type (Friedman) to one that
is highly regulated (Coons and Sugarman). One of the more interesting
schemes is Coons and Sugarman’s family power equalizing voucher plan. The
intention of this section is to outline the family power equalizing (FPE)
proposal and examine some of the consequences that emerge from such a
scheme.
Coons and Sugarman have their roots in the voucher plan from a different
source than most of the proponents of vouchers. As James S. Coleman notes,
“Its authors (Coons and Sugarman) have arrived at this voucher alternative
from a different starting point than most, that of financial equity in ed-
ucation” (Coons et al., 1978, p. xiii). In fact, Coons, Clune, and Sugarman ——
did extensive,work in the field of district power equalizing promoting a
philosophy of financial equity within the state. This fact has moderately
comforted those skeptics of the voucher system who criticize it for not
guaranteeing equal opportunity in education. Coons and Sugarman stress the
fact that some of the consequences of their plan are unknown and they admit
that speculation cannot be totally accurate. Therefore, they argue that FPE
be experimented with on a small scale. Coons and Sugarman address this issue
by stating the following:
Our aspirations, however, are modest. There is here no
intention to justify the prompt dismantling of the educa-
tional edifice. Our hope is only to show a new framework
for debating the question of a just educational order and
to stimulate tolerance for experimentation. We have not
canvassed every justifying argument for our conclusion.
And the prediction of every social consequence of family
choice is plainly undesirable in a book designed only to
support experimentation (Coons et al., 1978) P. 3) _—
The underlying motive of FPE is that it would give the family an
option in the level of education that children would receive. Education,
in Coons’ words, “may not be a function of wealth other than the wealth of
the state as a whole” (Coons et al., 1969, p. 311). Therefore, thevar- ——
ious levels of education must be instituted so that poor families can afford
the best level of education as easily as the most affluent families. Under
the Coons and Sugarman proposal, schools would be divided into eight cate-
gories. Categories A through D denote public schools; categories E through
H denote private schools. Schools in categories A and E would charge $600
tuition for kindergarten through the eighth grade, adn $900 tuition for kin-
school . Schools in categories B and F would charge $900 tuition for kin-
dergarten through the eighth grade and $1,200 through high school. Schools
in categories C and G would charge $1,200 tuition for kindergarten through
the eighth grade, and $1,500 through high school. Finally, schools in
categories D and H would charge $1,500 tuition for kindergarten through
eighth grade, and $1,800 through high school. Private schools would be
assigned to each category by the state superintendent (Arnold).31
According to the Coons-Sugarman proposal, each household would have
one or more schools available to it at each respective spending level.
Since families become the funding recipients, school districts would be
abolished and locally levied taxes for education would be replaced by
state levied taxes (Benson, p. 143). An agency would be created to take
over some of the duties that the districts previously handled. Parental
choice would then operate between private and public institutions and at
various spending levels. Everyone would have to pay a greater share of
their income for higher level schools irregardless of their income class.
Mark G. Arnold provides an excellent example of this in The Price of
Education:
Table 6
School categories and their respective tuition to families
at different income levels.
Poor Families with Income Less than $3,500
Category ~oken Payment
A and E
B and F $;;
Canal G $15
D and H $20
Families with Income Greater than $3,SO0 < $12,000 ——. -.
Category Tax —-
A and E $5 + 2.3% of income > $3,500
B and F $10 + 3.5% of income > $3,500
C and G $15 + 5.5% of income > $3,500
D and H $20 + 6.9% of income > $3,500
Families with Income > $12,000
Category Tax
A and E $200 -t3% of income > $12,000
B and F $310+4.2% of income > $12,000
C and G $450 + 5.8% of income > $12,000
D and H $610 + 7.6% of income > $12,000
Source: Arnold
No family would have to pay more than 1.5 times as much as the voucher is
worth (Arnold). A family with more than one child attending school would be
charged the same price as the first child enrolled when all the children32
attend the same school. If the children attended different level schools,
then the family would pay the average of the different prices for each
school (Coons et al., 1978, p. 198).
To demonstrate the way in which the system works, consider the follow-
ing example. Mr. A has an income of $15,000, Mr. B has an income of $2,500,
and Mr. C has an income of $7,200. Suppose Mr. A picks the highest level
school (D and H); Mr. B picks the second lowest level school (B and F);
and Mr. C picks the lowest level school (A and E). This would mean that
Mr. A would pay $610 + 7.6% of his taxable income; Mr. B would pay $10;
and Mr. C would pay $5 + 2.3% of his taxable income. This simple example
illustrates that a family pays more for the higher level school and that
the actual payment is related to income.
An important aspect of FPE is that the voucher may have no private
supplement for tuition. This is a vital difference in philosophies be-
tween FPE and Friedman’s voucher scheme. Coons and Sugarman argue that if
the voucher was allowed to be supplemented, the consequences would be that
the rich would enroll their children in the highest level schools and the
poor would be trapped in the lowest level schools. Clearly the affluent
can afford to add onto their vouchers whereas the poor would have a dif-
ficult time doing so. According to Charles S. Benson,
“Under the Coons arrangement, schools would receive the stated
amount known to parent and school alike ... depending on expen-
diture classification chosen by the school - neither more nor
less for each student enrolled. The state, of course, would
make up the difference between the stated fee and the yield of
the income-determined school tax rate on a given household’s
income - or receive the excess yield when the household was
very rich - but it would pay only the amount of the total fee
per student to the school” (Benson, p. 146).
This is significant for two reasons. First, the school receives equal
payment for every child and therefore all students would, ideally, be
treated equally. Second, the government is the entity paying the fee
the school rather than the household. Schools would have no financial
to
in-
centives to choose a pupil from a rich household versus a pupil from a
poor household. Of course, other factors such as the belief that pupils
from wealthier homes are easier to educate than those from poverty level
homes may prejudice the acceptance of a pupil into a school if not safe-
guarded against.
There are some fundamental requirements that must be met in order
for any type of voucher system to work. There must be adequate counseling,
free transportation for all, non-discriminatory admission and explusion
standards, and guarantees of racial integration.
If FPE is going to work effectively, adequate information and ease
of availability are mandatory. Coons and Sugarman declare, “In a system
with no options, ignorance might be bliss. In a system based on choice,
ignorance is ruin” (Coons et al., 1978, p. 148). The informational .—
service would necessarily provide information to the parents on topics33
such as: fees per pupil, structure and type of school, religious affili-
ation, mean scores on achievement tests that the school requires for ad-
mission, physical facilities, faculty, school hours, transportation to
and from school, maximum size of enrollment, an accurate assessment of the
financial structure of each school, and special.modes of instruction.
Responsibility for the informational service would rest in the hands of
government. The governmental agency would be responsible for disseminating
this information to all parents. However, private informational agencies
would be allowed to supplement the governmental agencies. Schools would
be required to open their doors to prospective buyers (parents) for ex-
amination of the facilities.
These are the broad responsibilities of the informational agency.
Coons and Sugarman believe that narrowing these broad responsibilities into
specific duties should come after experimentation of,FPE has been completed.
In other words, the specific role of the agency will be shaped by exper-
ience with the program. However, this does not imply that the general ob-
jectives and reasons for the agency should be decided after implementation.
Rather, it means that the specific directions of the agency (e.g., more
resources need to be shifted to providing minorities with better information
on free transportation to and from schools) will be determined by the prob-
lems that arise after the program is instituted (Coons, et al., 1978,
p. 148).
.—
In order to provide every family with adequate choice, free transpor-
tation must be available for all. There is, of course, some boundary where
free transportation becomes too costly and inefficient. Therefore, to pro-
tect the poor against the practice of paying the extra cost, transporting
outside these boundaries by parents would be forbidden. Coons and Sugarman
comment on but do not answer the question of whether the schools or the
state should pay for the transportation. If the school has to pay, children
living far away from the school may have a difficult time being admitted
into the school.
The admissions and expulsion standards are among the most delicate com-
ponents of FPE. Schools would be allowed to establish ceilings on their
enrollment. Thus, not all families would get their first choice of school.
However, everyone would have an equal chance, and each child would be
matched to a particular school as smoothly as possible. Parents would re-
ceive a list of schools available to their children within the boundaries
of transportation, After being informed of each school the family would
identify a first choice and some alternative choices. Each school that had
a vacancy would have to enroll any child that wanted to attend, although
schools could counsel parents against enrolling their child. If the school
had less vacancies than children who wanted to enroll, acceptance would be
determined by a lottery and preference would be given to children already
enrolled from a previous year and their siblings.
Expulsion standards of each school would be known to parents through
the informational service before the family chose the school. In Coons
and Sugarman’s opinion, schools should not be given the right to flunk out
students solely on the grounds of scholastic progress. However, schools
would not be encouraged to promote the student who does not meet the34
academic progress necessary for advancement (Coons et al., 1978, p. 146).
The standards for expulsion would be stipulated by the state legislature.
——
The reason for this is to protect the interests of the child, as well as
the interests of the school. The child should be protected against an un-
fair expulsion because of a discriminatory reason, e.g., a school should
be forbidden from expelling a special education student on the grounds that
it costs more to educate him or her. On the same token, the school should
be protected from the requirement to retain the delinquent pupil who causes
other pupils, as well as teachers and administrators, a lot of trouble.
Thus, a fine line must be established by the legislature for expulsion
standards that protect both parties from discrimination.
Probably the most debated issue of FPE is that of racial integration.
Advocates of FPE argue that giving the family a choice would mean at the
very least, integration would be greater than or equal to that experienced
with current policies. In her article “School Desecration: Outcomes for
Children”, Nancy St. John declares that:
Building choice into the desegregation plans need not mean
the postponement of integration for another generation, or
allowing blacks to be intimidated and whites to avoid racial-
ly mixed schools, or embarking on a weak middle-of-the-road
policy. It does mean taking the following into account:
1, The psychological power of self-determination.
2. The potential harm of conscription of all kinds and
of school assignment in disregard of the diverse
needs of individual children.
3, The danger of forcing the most hostile into a situation
they resent (St. John, pp. 112-123, 136-137).
The crux of the advocates’ arguments rests on the hypothesis that integra-
tion through family choice will be much more stable than integration through
regulation, and will thereby induce more integration through this stable
force. “It is in many instances”, in Coons and Sugarman’s words, “the only
hope for integration” (Coons et al., 1978, p. 109).
The component of free transportation theoretically gives support to
this argument. The issue of forced bussing would disappear since all
bussing would be done voluntarily. Advocates claim that as long as the
state provides for adequate information, transportation, and regulations
to families, integration should take place. It might very well be true
that blacks and other minorities will have to travel longer distances to
get equivalent education to whites but they will have this opportunity at
no extra monetary cost. ThuS , the opportunity is presented to anyone to
attend any school if they are qualified and wish to attend.
Some people argue that a system of choice, such as FPE, may be inter-
preted by whites as giving the opportunity to migrate from integrated
schools to schools that are exclusively white. There is no clear answer
to this concern as of now, because there is no current experimentation with
FPE. Advocates of FPE feel that there are many families, black and white,
that have children in segregated schools and want their children to attend
integrated schools. Therefore, if FPE is installed, both white and black35
children living in the city may “escape
1978, p. 115). But what about specific
segregation under FPE?
to suburban schools” (Coons et al., ——
legislative designs to prevent
Coons and Sugarman offer three plans to prevent segregation under a
system of family choice. The first plan would require schools with vacan-
cies to accept all children into their curriculum regardless of race, with
the exception of children who are not qualified because of age, physical
abnormalities, or so on (Coons et al,, 1978, p. 125). A lottery would be .—
conducted if the school had more applicants than available space. Under
this scheme the state could administer the entire admissions process.
School integration would then be a function of choice.
A second plan would be to require a minimum percentage of minority
students for each school. Schools that violated this rule would be sus-
pended from participation. This requirement would have to be flexible
enough to take into consideration areas that have a homogeneous popula-
tion of races. For instance, an area that only has a 1% black population
could not be required to have a 10% minimum of blacks in their schools,
for this would mean that virtually all schools in such an area would not
qualify for participation under the system. Hence, the requirement would
depend upon the actual percentage of minorities in each area.
The third plan would institute “dollar incentives” or “integration
bonuses” to schools that have a high rate of integration. For example, if
a family chose a school that is highly integrated their subsidy or voucher
might have a higher dollar value than if they chose a segregated school.
This would give each school an incentive to integrate. All three of Coons
and Sugarman’s proposals may be combined into one integration scheme if
necessary. For example, a scheme could require that when a school has more
applicants than space the school must hold two lotteries; one lottery, for
say 75 percent of vacancies, would include all applicants regardless of
race while the second lottery for the remaining vacancies (i.e., 25 percent)
would be limited to minorities. This oculd be extended to include inte-
gration bonuses and would thereby encompass plans one and three.
One issue that has received very little attention is the implementa-
tion of FPE in areas with only one or two schools. One suggested way to
induce competition into these areas is by allowing home instruction. At
the moment, some states do not recognize home instruction by a parent.
Others allow for it to be practiced only if the parent is a credentialed
educator (Coons et al., 1978, p. 183). The rationale for restricting most ——
home instruction is based on two points: (1) the state must have police
power to ensure that the child’s education level is adequate, and (2)
the state has an interest in socializing the child through exposure to
people and places that are outside the child’s home. Coons and Sugarman
disagree with this rationale. They feel that a child may be educated at
home and still gain the outside exposure deemed necessary by the state.
They also draw attention to the United States Supreme Court case Pierce
versus Society of Sisters. In this case the state of Oregon sought to force
all children into public schools. The Supreme Court held that such a law
was in violation of the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
that every family is guaranteed a right to choose the type of education it36
wishes to seek as long as it meets the state standards. In Coons and
Sugarman’s opinion, these restrictive laws “rest uneasily with the consti-
tutional right of the family outlined by the Supreme Court” in the above
case. Finally, they argue that those few families that choose home in-
struction will most likely do a good job (Coons et al., 1978, p. 183). ——
The home instruction scheme would need to be regulated by the state.
The administrative authority would require that any one participating in
the program would need to file a proposal of the objectives for their
children and how they would be achieved. If the authority accepted the
proposal, the subsidy would be granted. However, at any time the authority
could discontinue the subsidy if it found the objectives were not being
met . Flagrant abuses of the program would result in the family losing its
privilege to even select the school for its children to attend (Coons et al.,
1978, p. 184), Home instruction programs would need to be closely monitored
——
for abuses.
If the area has only one school and it is not providing adequate edu-
cation, the force of competition should induce a new school to provide an
alternative to the existing one. An analogy based upon a common situation
may be helpful in understanding this point. Consider a small town with
one grocery store. If the owner abuses his or her monopoly power by pro-
viding poor service at outrageously high prices then a new store, if started,
would most likely capture many of the buyers from the market. Consequently,
the old store owner would have to provide better service at reasonable
prices in order to compete with the new store. The end result is a more
competitive structure that resulted from abuses by the monopolist. It is
important to note that in many areas, one school may provide an excellent
education and another school may not be required. In ‘these areas, new
schools will not be started because the demand for an alternative school
is low.
Summary
The intention of the summary is to integrate all of the finance
schemes that have been covered thus far. Rather than repeating the high–
lights of all the policies that have been examined, the summary will in-
stead list a number of different values or goals of decision-makers and
the respective policies or combination of policies that satisfy them.
IF ONE FAVORS ... POSSIBLE FINANCE POLICY
I. A policy that emphasizes equali-
zation of educational resources
among funding recipients on the
basis of variations in costs
A. Considers variation in costs (i)
among districts (ii)
(iii)
Cost-based grant to each district
District power equalizing with
cost-based grant
A minimum program in addition to
any of the above options37
B. Considers variat ions in
costs among families
II. A policy that has major emphasis
on administrative simplicity and
secondary emphasis on equaliza-
tion of educational resources to
the funding recipients
A. The district as the funding
unit
B. The family as the funding
unit
III. A policy that allows for the most
choice or freedom on the part of
the funding recipient.
A. The district as the funding
unit
B. The family as the funding
unit
Iv. A policy that is primarily pro-
gressive in the raising and
distribution of aid to the fund-
ing units ~1
(i) Cost-based grant to all families
(e.g., voucher policy)
(ii) Family power equalizing with cost-
based grant
(iii) A minimum program in addition to










Uniform funding formula with a
minimum foundation program
Uniform funding formula
Uniform funding formula with a
minimum amount of resources per
family ~1
Uniform funding formula with Ilo
lower or upper limits placed on
local spending
A policy where the state aid
proportion is low
Uniform grant voucher to the
family
Family power equalizing with
uniform grant (voucher)
(iii) Family power equalizing with
cost-based grant (voucher)
A. The district as the funding (i) Uniform grant with a major por-
unit tion of school aid from the state
(ii) Cost-based grant with a major por-
tion of school aid from the state
(j/ A policy where the family is the funding recipient would be a type of
voucher system, such as FPE.
~1 All of the policies under section IV require the following assumption:
The state collects its revenue for education from a progressive tax
(e.g., progressive income tax).38








District power equalizing scheme
that is primarily a state aid
policy (either uniform grant or
cost-based)
A minimum program that guarantees
a high level of resources for
each district (the extreme in
this case would be full state
financing)
Uniform grant with a major por-
tion of aid from the state
Cost–based grant with a major por-
tion of aid from the state
Family power equalizing that is
primarily a state aid policy (either
uniform grant or cost-based grant)
A minimum program that guarantees
a high level of resources for each
family (the extreme in this case
would-be full state financing)
v. A policy that rewards the tax
effort of the funding recipient.
A. The district as the funding
unit
B. The family as the funding
unit
VI. A policy that stresses decentrali-
zation of education.
A. The district as the funding
unit
B. The family as the funding
unit
VII. A policy that maximizes the dollar
value of output by creating incen-
tives to cut costs.
A. The district as the funding
unit
(i) District power equalizing with
a uniform grant
(ii) District power equalizing with
a cost-based grant
(i) Family power equalizing with
a uniform grant
(ii) Family power equalizing with a
cost-based grant
(i) Uniform grant with a low per-
centage of aid from the state
(ii) Cost-based grant with a low
percentage of aid from the
state
(i) Voucher program with a low degree
of restrictions (e.g., an unregu-
lated voucher system)
(i) Uniform funding formula
(ii) District power equalizing with
a uniform grant39
B. The family as the funding
unit
VII. A policy that maximizes the dollar
value of output by creating incen-
tives to cut costs.
A. The district as the funding
unit
B. The family as the funding
unit
VIII. A tax that is based on a person’s
ability to contribute
IX. A taxation system where the mar-
ginal tax equals the marginal
benefits from the goods and ser-








Voucher program with a low degree
of restrictions (e.g., an unregu-
lated voucher system)
Uniform funding formula
District power equalizing with
a uniform grant
Voucher program with uniform
vouchers
Family power equalizing with
uniform vouchers
A tax that conforms well to the
ability to pay principle such as
a progressive income tax
A tax that comforms to the bene-
fit principle such as the proper-
ty tax El
~/
Some argue that the property tax conforms well to the benefit prin-
ciple because the revenue raised by it increases property values.40
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